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The suicide attack is an infamous method of warfare mostly associated with Islamic militant 
groups. While there are numerous aspects from which to discuss this method of warfare from 
a fiqh al-siyar (Islamic international law) perspective, this article specifically highlights suicide 
attacks when they disguise as civilians which they often do. Few contemporary jurists discuss 
this particular aspect of suicide attacks, and even those have mostly missed one issue: it might 
be an impermissible treasonous deception. This article explores whether suicide attacks 
disguising as civilians constitutes as an act of treason in fiqh al-siyar. It is found that such 
method of attack is not in itself treasonous therefore not in itself impermissible. However, 
suicide attacks disguising as civilians may become treasonous depending on the 
circumstances. Further, even when it is not treasonous it can be impermissible due to other 
reasons such as modern International Humanitarian Law (IHL), or maṣlaḥat.  
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Abstrak 
Serangan bunuh diri adalah suatu metode serangan yang biasanya dinisbatkan kepada 
kelompok-kelompok militant Islam. Ada banyak aspek dari serangan bunuh diri sebagai 
metode perang yang dapat dibahas dari sudut pandang fikih siyar (hukum internasional 
Islam). Akan tetapi, artikel ini menyoroti sisi penyamaran sebagai warga sipil yang seringkali 
dilakukan pelaku serangan bunuh diri. Hanya sebagian kecil pakar yang membahas sisi ini, 
dan biasanya meluputkan salah satu isu: bisa jadi taktik ini merupakan tipudaya berupa 
khianat yang tidak diperbolehkan. Artikel ini membahas apakah serangan bunuh diri dengan 
menyamar sebagai warga sipil merupakan khianat sebagaimana dikenal dalam fikih siyar. 
Disimpulkan bahwa taktik ini prinsipnya tidak tergolong khianat, tapi ia berubah menjadi 
bersifat khianat tergantung situasinya. Selain itu, taktik tersebut tetap bisa menjadi terlarang 
dalam syariat karena pengaruh Hukum Humaniter Internasional (HHI) dan maṣlaḥat.  
 
Kata Kunci: jihad, Islam, penipuan, syiar, hukum international 
 
Introduction 
ince the two hijacked planes crashed into the twin towers of the World 
Trade Center in the United States of America in September 11, 2001,1 the 
world was not the same anymore. Suicide attacks became an infamous 
method associated with ‘Islamic extremism’, occurring in various places in the 
 
1 Thereafter known as the “9/11” incident. This is of course putting aside the conspiracy 
theories, which is a discussion for another forum. See: “The Official Theory | Twin Towers,” 
ae911truth.org, accessed April 17, 2019, https://www.ae911truth.org/evidence/the-official-theory-
twin-towers. 
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world such as the 2004 Bali Bombing2 and very recently in Syria in 2019.3 Surely, 
there are so much more cases such as in Palestine, Afghanistan, and many more.  
Incidents like this specifically and the situation of armed conflict in many 
Muslim states generally are perhaps among the main reasons why there is a rising 
need for researches on the Islamic law (fiqh) on the conduct of armed conflict and 
how they relate to modern International Humanitarian Law.4 Additionally, as the 
Syrian and Yemen Civil War is showing, groups labelled as terrorists (like Al-
Qaeda) have evolved from hidden cells within various nations into major military 
groups fighting in open war. When they claim to follow only Islamic law and 
denounce everything un-Islamic, it may be imperative to dwell in their own 
sources to truly understand and assess the issue. 
From an Islamic law perspective, there are multiple aspects of suicide 
attacks which are subject to scholarly discourse. The first aspect is on rules related 
to the impermissibility of suicide, where jurists disagree on whether suicide 
attacks fall under the category of ‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah. Usually also referred to 
as ‘martyrdom operations’, ‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah means daring attacks where 
the combatant does not expect to survive, and intends to inflict as much damage 
as possible to the enemy. For example, a combatant slipping into an enemy base 
and attack as much as possible without intention of retreating, until the enemy 
finally neutralises the combatant (hopefully, after causing much damage). 
‘Amaliyyah istishhadiyyah is a known and permissible method of attack in Islamic 
laws of war, but some jurists argue that suicide attacks in form of suicide bombing 
would fall under impermissible suicide instead of ‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah.5 
The second aspect discussed by the scholars is the target of attacks. While 
some suicide attacks do target enemy military forces,6 but the aforementioned 
examples of the 9/11 and Bali Bombing targeted civilians. In discussing this issue, 
all jurists agree that civilians may not be attacked. These jurists either specifically 
 
2 “Bali Death Toll Set at 202,” BBC News, February 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2778923.stm. 
3 Eric Schmitt, Ben Hubbard, and Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Attack in Syria Kills 4 
Americans, Raising New Worries About Troop Withdrawal,” New York Times, January 16, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/world/middleeast/isis-attack-syria-troops.html. 
4 See inter alia Ahmed Al-Dawoody, “IHL and Islamic Law in Contemporary Armed 
Conflict: Expert Workshop, Geneva 29-30 October 2018” (Genev, 2019), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/eyperts-workshop-report-ihl-and-islamic-law-contemporary-
armed-conflicts. 
5 Further reading on the subject: Yūsuf Al-Qarḍāwi, Min Hadyi Al-Islâm Fatâwâ Al-
Mu’âshirah, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifah, 2001), 503–5; Muhammad Afifi Al-Akiti, Defending the 
Transgressed by Censuring the Reckless against the Killing of Civilians (Germany and United Kingdom: 
Warda Publications and Aqsa Press, 2005); Nawaf Hail Takruri, Al-‘Amaliyyat Al-Istishhadiyyah Fi Al-
Mizan Al-Fiqhiy (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1997); Muhammad Saalih Al-Munajjid, “Ruling on Blowing 
Oneself Up,” islamqa, accessed March 14, 2019, https://islamqa.info/en/answers/217995/ruling-on-
blowing-oneself-up; Mufti Siraj Desai, “Are What the Western Media Calls ‘Suicide Bombings’ 
Allowed in Islam?,” islamqa.org, accessed March 14, 2019, 
https://islamqa.org/hanafi/askmufti/44811. 
6 “Army Intelligence Chief Killed in Deadly Homs Attack,” Aljazeera, February 26, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/army-intelligence-chief-killed-deadly-homs-attack-
170225132504480.html. 
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mention that civilians may not be targeted, or they say that the suicide bombings 
may be targeted only to enemy forces which essentially means the same thing.7 In 
fact, the Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has reprimanded (albeit softly) Abu 
Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (former leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who was killed in 2006) 
regarding killing laymen Shi‘a in Iraq.8 
However, Muhammad Munir pointed out an interesting aspect which is 
usually not discussed. Munir noted that numerous suicide bombing attacks are 
conducted by persons who are disguising themselves as civilians. He pointed out 
that such a manner of attack is a form of treachery which is impermissible in 
Islamic laws of war.9  
This article examines the Islamic laws of war i.e. fiqh al-jihad, particularly 
regarding deception and its limits. The permissibility of feigning as civilians is 
focused on, and the other aspects of the discourse on suicide attacks (i.e. 
classification as ‘amaliyyah istishhadiyyah, and target selection) are not discussed. 
The article will then see whether feigning as civilians is unlawful due to its alleged 
classification as unlawful treachery. 
 
Islamic law and international law 
Radical groups (e.g. Al-Qaeda, ISIS) can denounce international law to the 
extent that, according to the top Al-Qaeda theologian Abu Muhammad Al-
Maqdisi, those who join the international law system under the United Nations are 
kafirs (disbelievers).10 However, likewise, mainstream international law has been 
criticized for ‘othering’ anything non-Western.11 It is certainly interesting to note 
how radical Islamists and ‘Eurocentric’ lawyers may actually share similar 
mentality in some respects. 
From an international law perspective, historically, Islamic law has 
positively contributed towards the development of modern international 
humanitarian law (IHL). As noted by Jean Pictet, it was long since the Muslim 
 
7 See: Al-Qarḍāwi, Min Hadyi Al-Islâm Fatâwâ Al-Mu’âshirah, 3:503–5; Takruri, Al-‘Amaliyyat 
Al-Istishhadiyyah Fi Al-Mizan Al-Fiqhiy; Al-Munajjid, “Ruling on Blowing Oneself Up”; Desai, “Are 
What the Western Media Calls ‘Suicide Bombings’ Allowed in Islam?” Afifi Akiti, who does not 
approve suicide bombing due to suicide, also emphasized on the civilian targets as well in his fatwa: 
Al-Akiti, Defending the Transgressed by Censuring the Reckless against the Killing of Civilians, 20, see also 
the title which clearly emphasizes this aspect. 
8 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation),” Combating 
Terrorism Center, 8–9, accessed April 17, 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-
Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf. 
9 Muhammad Munir, “Suicide Attacks: Martyrdom Operations or Acts of Perfidy?,” in Islam 
and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives, ed. Marie-Luisa Frick and 
Andreas Th. Muller (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 83–84; Muhammad Munir, 
“Suicide Attacks and Islamic Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 869 (2008): 82–84. 
10 Al-Maqdisi was specificaly explaining why Saudi Arabia is not an Islamic state, and rather 
it is a kafir state: Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Saudi Di Mata Seorang Al Qaidah (Solo: Jazera, 2005), 
85–138. 
11 See inter alia Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The 
Metaphor of Human Rights,” Harvard International Law Journal 42, no. 1 (2001): 201–46. 
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armies had their code of war which included a ‘principle of distinction’, and the 
Muslims were more faithful and loyal to peace agreements.12 Even further, Khaled 
Bashir pointed out that the Grotius and the other European founders of 
international law have been outsmarted in terms of depth and width of coverage 
in international law literature generally and laws of war specifically by the Islamic 
civilizations centuries before Grotius came.13 
This is why we now have lawyers (Muslim or otherwise) calling for the 
recognition and inclusion of Islamic law traditions in the development of 
international law as one of the world’s big legal families.14 If Islamic law has 
historically influenced the development of international law, and is among the big 
legal families in the world, then more substantive and fair dialogue must be done 
for this purpose. 
From an Islamic law perspective, international law is to some extent 
actually recognized as this section explains. One will find that, from an Islamic 
standpoint, following some parts of international law may actually be part of an 
Islamic obligation. It is therefore important to explore how international law and 
Islamic law interacts with each other in order to make a proportionate assessment 
of matters related to both laws. 
When speaking of ‘Islamic law’ (fiqh), one speaks of hukum shar‘i (rulings 
of the Shari‘ah) which has three elements: Al-Hakim (Lawgiver, i.e. Allah), mahkum 
fih (the act which the ruling operates to), and mahkum ‘alayh (the subject of law).15 
Especially regarding the subject of law, in principle the central subject of Islamic 
law is only natural persons.16 This is because obedience is part of the obligation of 
worship in Islam, because the concept of ‘religion’ (Al-Din) in Islam encompasses 
 
12 Jean Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Geneva: Henry 
Dunant Institute, 1985), 15–17. 
13 Khaled Ramadan Bashir, Islamic International Law: Historical Foundations and Al-Shaybani’s 
Siyar (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2018). 
14 Christopher G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1988); Julie Fraser, “Exploring Legal Compatibilities and Pursuing Cultural Legitimacy: 
Islamic Law and the International Criminal Court,” in Intersections of Law and Culture at the 
International Criminal Court, ed. Julie Fraser and Brianne McGonigle Leyh (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2020); Awn S. Al-Khasawneh, “Islam and International Law,” in Islam and International Law: Engaging 
Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspectives, ed. Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Th Müller (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 29–44. 
15 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (Selangor: The Other Press, 2003), 45–46. 
16 Nyazee, 110. There is debate on whether Islamic law recognises ‘legal persons’ as subject 
of law. Compare: Muhammad Taqi Usmani, “The Principle of Limited Liability,” in Meezanbank’s 
Guide to Islamic Banking, ed. Muhammad Imran Ashraf Usmani (Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 2002); Siti 
Kholifatul Rizkiah and Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, “A Critical Examination Towards The Islamic 
Discourse on ‘Limited Liability,’” UUM Journal of Legal Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 1–36; Kevin F Forbes, 
“Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation’(1986),” Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 2, no. 1 (1986): 163–77. 
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not only theology and ritual worship but also ‘obeying commands and heeding 
prohibitions’.17 Law, then, is an extension of that obedience to Allah.18 
Islamic law is binding on the individual Muslims, and this is regardless 
whether they are under the jurisdiction of an Islamic state. Such an Islamic state 
only take role to facilitate the administration and fulfillment of these laws.19 
Meaning, even if there is no Islamic state to enforce the hudud (criminal sanctions 
specifically regulated in the Qur’an and Sunnah), the hudud crimes (inter alia 
theft, fornication, adultery, unfounded adultery accusation, rebellion, armed 
robbery, and apostasy)20 are still acts of major sin regardless and therefore still 
prohibited. 
Another important aspect to understand also is that the primary sources of 
Islamic law are the Qur’ān and Sunnah as primary sources of law. Rejecting them 
(while putting other laws above the Qur’ān and Sunnah) would render a Muslim 
as a disbeliever.21 As Allah says in various places in the Qur’ān, inter alia in Surah 
al-Mā ‘idah (5) verse 50: 
 َوَمْن َأْحَسُن ِمَن اَّللَِّ ُحْكًما ل َِقْوٍم يُوِقُنوَن  
 أََفُحْكَم اْْلَاِهِليَِّة يَ ب ُْغوَنَۚ
 “Then is it the judgement of [the time of] ignorance they desire? But 
who is better than Allah in judgement for a people who are certain 
[in faith].” 
See also Surah al-Nisā (4) verse 59: 
ْيٍء ََيأَي َُّها الَِّذيَن آَمُنوا َأِطيُعوا اَّللََّ َوَأِطيُعوا الرَُّسوَل َوأُوِل اْْلَْمِر ِمنُكْمْۖ فَِإن تَ َناَزْعُتْم ِف شَ 
  ِلَك َخْْيٌ َوَأْحَسُن ََتِْويًًل ُسوِل ِإن ُكنُتْم تُ ْؤِمُنوَن ِِبَّللَِّ َواْليَ ْوِم اْْلِخرِْۖ ذَ  فَ ُردُّوُه ِإََل اَّللَِّ َوالرَّ 
“O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and 
those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, 
refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah 
and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.” 
 
17 Muhammad bin ’Abd Allah Al-Suhaym, Al-Islam Usuuluhu Mabaadi’uhu (KSA: Wizarah 
Al-Shu’un Al-Islamiyah wa al-Awqaf wa al-Da’wah wa al-Irshaad, 1421), 105. See also a linguistic 
semantic breakdown of the term Al-Din which would reveal the same: Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-
Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview 
of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations, 1995), 42; 
Aḥmad Mukhtār, Mu‘jam Al-Lughah Al-‘Arabiyyah Mu‘Aṣirah (al-Qāhirah: ‘Alam al-Kutub, 2008), 796. 
18 See: Umar F. Abd-Allah, “Theological Dimensions of Islamic Law,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
19 Wahbah Al-Zuḥaylī, Fiqih Islam Wa Al-Adillatuhu, vol. 8 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2011), 
461–62; Musthafa Al-Khin and Musthafa Al-Bugha, Konsep Kepemimpinan Dan Jihad Dalam Islam: 
Menurut Madzhab Syafi’i (Jakarta: Darul Haq, 2014). 
20 ‘Abd Al-Qādir ‘Awdah, Al-Tashri‘ Al-Jinā’i Al-Islāmī Muqāranan Bi Al-Qānūn Al-Waḍ‘I (al-
Qāhirah: Maktabah Dar al-Turath, 2003), 634–63. 
21 Imam ibn Katsir, Shahih Tafsir Ibnu Katsir, ed. Safiurrahman Al-Mubarakfuri, vol. 3 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Katsir, 2016), 149; Ibn Abī ‘Alī Al-Ḥanafi, Sharḥ Al-’Aqīdah Al-Ṭaḥawiyyah, vol. 
2 (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1997), 446. See also: Haji Abdulmalik Abdulkarim Amrullah, Tafsir 
Al-Azhar, vol. 3 (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional PTE Ltd, n.d.), 1758–60. 
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This shows that non-Islamic sources are rejected, making the previously 
mentioned radical Islamist position having some foundation. However, when one 
says ‘non-Islamic sources are rejected’, does not necessarily mean that literally 
everything has to be specifically regulated in the Qur’an and Sunnah. After all, 
only a minority of verses in the Qur’an contain specific legal rulings.22  
As for the Sunnah, perhaps it would take a special research to calculate the 
proportions. We know some great hadith compilations specifically includes only 
legal rulings, such as Imam Malik’s Muwatta and the Sunans of Abu Dawud and 
Al-Tirmidhi. Others include other topics e.g. theology, manners, faith, knowledge, 
Quran interpretation, and various others, such as Sahih Al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-
Muslim, and Musnad Imam Ahmad. Nonetheless, law is just one out of various 
other subjects under the broad scope of Islamic sciences, necessitating law-related 
Qur’an verses and Sunnah to be a minority. 
When there are matters which are not specifically regulated in the Qur’ān 
and Sunnah, the Islamic jurists will conduct ijtihād to explore the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah in order to find rulings of fiqh (Islamic law) to be interpreted and applied 
towards the matter.23 In doing so, the jurists will consider other instruments and 
sources such as as ijmā‘ (‘consensus’), qiyās (‘analogy’), ‘urf (‘customary laws’), 
maṣlaḥat (‘benefits’), and others.24  
The Islamic laws of war (fiqh al-jihad) is a chapter under Islamic 
international law (fiqh al-siyar).25 Parts of it takes the central role of the Muslim 
state, such as where international agreements must be obeyed by both the Muslim 
state and the Muslims under its jurisdiction insofar as they do not contradict the 
Qur’an and Sunnah.26 In context of war specifically or governance generally, 
maṣlaḥat (benefit) is a particularly important consideration when deriving rulings, 
war maneuvers, or state policy in general.27 It is however important to note that 
 
22 Asep Sulhadi, “Mengenal Ayat-Ayat Hukum Dalam Al-Qur’an,” Jurnal Samawat 1, no. 1 
(2017): 4.  
23 Imam Al-Shafi’i, Shafi’is Risalah: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Translated with an Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by Majid Khadduri), 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The 
Islamic Texts Society, 1987), 288; Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence, 214 and 263; Muhammad bin Shalih 
Al-Utsaimin, Ushul Fiqih (Yogyakarta: Media Hidayah, 2008), 128.  
24  Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence, 213–60; Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law: From Historical 
Foundations to Contemporary Practise (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 57–63. 
25 See: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abi Sahl Al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ Al-Siyār Al-Kabīr (Egypt: Al-
Shirkah al-Sharqiyyah li l-I‘lānāt, 1971); Abū Isḥāq Al-Fazārī, Kitāb Al-Siyar (Beirut: Mu’assasah al-
Risālāh, 1408). 
26 Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 2011), 
18, 32–33; Aḥmad ibn `Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmu‘ Al-Fatāwa, vol. 31 (Dar al-Wafa, 1426), 
19. See also on customary international law: Md Anowar Zahid and Rohimi B Shapiee, “Considering 
Custom in the Making of Siyar (Islamic International Law),” JE Asia & Int’l L. 3 (2010): 123; 
Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, 34–37. 
27 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 118; Abdul Wahab Khallaf, Ilmu Ushul Fiqih (Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta, 
1993), 123. 
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maṣlaḥat is derived from and finds its indicators in the Qur’ān and Sunnah, 
therefore maṣlaḥat must not contravene the Qur’ān and Sunnah.28 
Other parts of the Islamic laws of war creates obligation towards 
individuals, such as the prohibition to kill certain persons in war (women, 
children, the elderly, the incapacitated, etc).29 One would find that these rules could 
be found not only in ‘moderate’ scholarship but also in ‘radical-inclined’ 
scholarship.30 Sometimes there are matters where it falls upon the Muslim 
commander (not necessarily the state) to make strategic decisions based on 
maṣlaḥat, such as in determining the fate of war captives.31 
There can also interaction also between the state acts and the individual, 
such as how it is forbidden to kill a non-Muslim which with whom the Islamic 
state has a peace agreement with.32 As mentioned earlier, an agreement entered 
into by the Muslim state is binding towards all the Muslims in it. Especially in 
context of war, sometimes there are certain agreements that can be put to halt such 
as trade agreements. However, some agreements remain in effect especially if they 
are precisely about what to do or not to do during war.33  
However, there will be questions on whether the agreement contradicts the 
Qur’an and Sunnah (making the former null and void), or situations where non-
state Islamic fighters are not parties to an agreement entered into by a state which 
they do not recognize. In such situations, it would revert back to the Muslim 
fighters’ individual obligations as previously mentioned. 
 
Perfidy and treachery in war: an overview 
War is more than just a competition of weapons and manpower. Rather, 
the play of planning and strategy is very vital, so much that they have caused large 
and strong armies to be defeated by weaker and smaller counterparts. A very 
famous example of this war was the Battle of Yarmouk, where the Muslim army 
of around 36.000 to 46.000 defeated a massive Roman (Byzantine) army of around 
120.000 to 240.000 (the numbers are contested, but the sources are unanimous that 
it was a small army defeating a much larger one).34 Owing to inter alia Khālid ibn 
 
28 Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān Al-Būthī, Ḍawābiṭ Al-Maṣlaḥat Fī Al-Sharī‘ah Al-Islāmiyyah 
(Bayrūt: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1973), 129, 161, and 216; Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence, 198–99; Bakr 
bin Abdullah and Muhammad bin Shalih Al-Utsaimin, Syarah Hilyah Thalibil Ilmi (Akhlak Pencari 
Ilmu) (Jakarta: Akbar Media, 2013), 215. 
29 Al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ Al-Siyār Al-Kabīr, 1971, para 2741; Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s 
Primer, trans. Imran Ahsan Nyazee Khan, vol. 1 (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 2000), 458–60; Wahbah 
Al-Zuḥaylī, Āthār Al-Ḥarb Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islāmī (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 1419), 494–95. 
30 See inter alia Abdullah Azzam, Jihad: Adab Dan Hukumnya (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 
1993), 24, 30.  
31 Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, 1:456–57. 
32 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 4 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), 
ḥadīth no.3166.  
33 Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, 198–99. 
34 See: Ismail ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa Nihayah: Masa Kulafa’ur Rasyidin, ed. Muhammad bin 
Shamil As-Sulami (Jakarta: Darul Haq, 2004), 157–60; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr Al-Ṭabari, The History of 
Al-Tabari, trans. Khalid Yahya Blankinship, vol. 11 (New York: State University of New York Press, 
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Al-Walīd’s tactical genius, the Muslims not only won but also managed to kill from 
50.000 to 120.000 Romans while themselves losing only 3000.35  
An important part of war strategy involves the use of ruses and deception, 
which’s use has been all over the pages of the history of warfare. Sometimes armies 
use tricks in such a way that enemies, sometimes ones they cannot normally defeat, 
are caught off guard and defeated. A very famous example of this is when the 
Greek alliance sneaked a small force into a giant wooden horse sent to the Trojans 
who took the ‘gift’ inside their previously impenetrable city walls.36 Even Sun Tzu, 
the famous strategist from ancient China, cannot emphasize enough on the 
importance of deception in warfare.37 
However, even throughout history, there are certain kinds of deception 
which are shunned and seen as an unacceptable method of warfare. Emer de Vattel 
and Hugo Grotius, for example, in context of the legality of assassination towards 
enemy leaders, have argued on the extent of which such acts may be treasonous.38  
Patricia Zengel gave some examples of other early commentators of the 
laws of war such as Alberico Gentili and C. Van Bynkershoek holding the same 
position as De Vattel and Grotius on the aforementioned matters.39 Zengel 
concluded that, according to the aforementioned commentators and reflective of 
the law of nations at the time, the term ‘treachery’ meant “… betrayal by one owing 
an obligation of good faith to the intended victim.”40 
In modern IHL, the rule to allow ruses and deception in general except 
when they are treasonous still persists as, in the words of the Jean-Maria 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, “a long-standing rule of customary 
international law”.41 Generally, treasonous deception is usually termed as perfidy42 
which is defined as follows: 
“…acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to 
believe that he is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with 
intent to betray that confidence...”43 
 
1993), 86–87, 98, 100–102; Agha Ibrahim Akram, The Sword of Allah: Khalid Bin Al-Waleed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 425.  
35 ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa Nihayah: Masa Kulafa’ur Rasyidin, 157–60; Al-Ṭabari, The History 
of Al-Tabari, 11:86–87, 98, 100–102; Akram, The Sword of Allah: Khalid Bin Al-Waleed, 425. 
36 See generally: Homer, The Iliad (New York: Penguin Group, 1990). 
37 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Restored Translation) (Pax Librorum Publishing House, 2009), 4–
5. 
38 Emer De Vattel and Joseph Chitty, The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (PH Nicklin & T. Johnson, 1835), 358–59, 
363,. 
39 Patricia Zengel, “Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict” (The Judge Advocate 
General’s School, United States Army, 1991), 6–14. 
40 Zengel, 14. 
41 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 203. See also Article 37(2) of AP I. 
42 Although not all acts of unlawful deception necessarily fall under the definition perfidy, 
as shown in the later paragraphs. 
43 Article 37(1) of AP I.  
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In addition, Article 15 of the Lieber Code needs to be mentioned: 
“…such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith 
either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into 
during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist.” 
It may seem that modern IHL prohibits perfidy specifically only in combat 
situations, as Article 37(1) reads as follows: “It is prohibited to kill, injure or 
capture an adversary by resort to perfidy.” However, this is not to suggest that 
treachery is permitted in other situations. Rather, good faith (which treachery and 
deceit are breaches of)44 is a general principle of international law applicable in all 
situations.45 
It is interesting that there seems to be a shift of paradigm between treachery 
before and upon the arrival of modern IHL. As Zengel noted, the modern IHL 
concept of perfidy shifts from protecting the victim of treachery towards 
protecting a greater interest of the international community. She said: 
“In this context that means that the continued potency of 
protections established for civilian noncombatants depends upon 
those protections not being available to shield those who are 
combatants. The object to be protected is not the targeted adversary, 
but rather the safety of the civilian population and, more generally, 
continued confidence in law and international agreements.”46  
In addition, Article 37(1) of AP I provide some examples of acts of perfidy: 
a. the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender; 
b. the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness; 
c. the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and 
d. the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms 
of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict. 
It must be noted that numerous instruments of modern IHL (including the 
AP I) are in form of treaties. As per Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969, treaties are binding to states who are parties to it. In addition, 
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louis Doswald-Beck has compiled evidences of state 






44 Jean Pictet et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 of 12 August 1949, ed. 
Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (Geneva: International Committee of 
the Red Cross and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), para. 1483. 
45 See: Robert Kolb, “Principles As Sources Of International Law (With Special Reference to 
Good Faith),” Netherlands International Law Review 53, no. 1 (2006): 1–36; Michael P Van Alstine, “The 
Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection,” The Georgetown Law Journal 
93 (2005): 1885–1945; Tariq Hassan, “Good Faith in Treaty Formation,” Vancouver Journal of 
International Law 21 (1980): 443. 
46 Zengel, “Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict,” 36. 
47 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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War and deception in Islamic law 
With regards to the matter of treachery and perfidy, Islam has always been 
clear. After all, honesty and trustworthiness are among the most basic traits of a 
Muslim. In fact, they are among the four characteristics necessary of the prophets 
AS: faṭānah (intelligent), tabligh (conveys the message), and relevant to this article: 
ṣiddīq (truthful) and amānah (trustworthy).48 
There is endless evidence in the Qur’ān and Sunnah on the importance of 
truthfulness and trustworthiness.  
1. Truthfulness, Lying, and War 
With respect to truthfulness, there is endless evidence in the Qur’ān and 
Sunnah on the importance of truthfulness. Among so many others, Allah says in 
the Qur’ān, Surah al-Tawbah (9) verse 119: 
 ََيأَي َُّها الَِّذيَن آَمُنوا ات َُّقوا اَّللََّ وَُكونُوا َمَع الصَّاِدِقنَي  
 “O you who have believed, fear Allah and be with those who are 
true.” 
Allah says in Surah Al-Azhab (33) verse 24: 
َب اْلمُ   ِإنَّ اَّللََّ ل َِيْجزَِي اَّللَُّ الصَّاِدِقنَي ِبِصْدِقِهْم َويُ َعذِ 
َناِفِقنَي ِإن َشاَء َأْو يَ ُتوَب َعَلْيِهْمَۚ
 َكاَن َغُفورًا رَِّحيًما  
 “That Allah may reward the truthful for their truth and punish the 
hypocrites if He wills or accept their repentance. Indeed, Allah is 
ever Forgiving and Merciful.” 
With respect to trustworthiness, there are also endless evidence of its importance. 
In fact, the term amānah is derived from the root ن م ا , from which the word īmān 
(faith) is also derived from.49 Allah says in the Qur’ān, Surah Al-Anfāl (8) verse 27: 
 ََيأَي َُّها الَِّذيَن آَمُنوا ََل ََتُونُوا اَّللََّ َوالرَُّسوَل َوََتُونُوا أََماََنِتُكْم َوأَنُتْم تَ ْعَلُموَن  
 “O you who have believed, do not betray Allah and the Messenger 
or betray your trusts while you know [the consequence].” 
Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, as reported by Abu Hurayrah, said in the famous ḥadīth 
regarding the hypocrites: 
نََ َخانََ  آيَةَم اْلممَناِفقَِ َثاَلثَ  ِإَذا َحدَّثََ َكَذَب، َوِإَذا َوَعدََ َأْخَلَف، َوِإذََا اْؤُتِم
"The signs of a hypocrite are three: Whenever he speaks, he tells a 
lie. Whenever he promises, he always breaks it (his promise). 
 
48 Miftaḥ ibn Ma’mūn ibn ‘Abdillah Al-Shianjūr, Al-Ḥāshiyah Al-Martiyah ‘alā Tijān Al-Durārī 
(Cianjur: Ma‘had al-Islāmī al-Salafī, n.d.), 15–16; Imam Zarkasyi, Usuluddin ('Aqa’id) Ala Madzhab 
Ahlu Al-Sunna Wa Al-Jama’ah (Gontor: Trimurti Press, 2014), 58–59; Sayid Ahmad Al-Marzuki, Ilmu 
Tauhid Tingkat Dasar: Terjemah Aqidatul Awam Makna Pegon Dan Terjemah Indonesia, trans. Achmad 
Sunarto (Surabaya: Al-Miftah, 2012), 24; Muḥammad al-Nawawī Al-Jāwī, Tijan A-Darari (Surabaya: 
Mutiara Ilmu, 2010), 30–35. 
49 Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon: In Eight Parts, vol. 1 (Beirut: Librairie du 
Liban, 1968), 102. 
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Whenever he is entrusted, he betrays (proves dishonest). (If you 
keep something as a trust with him, he will not return it)."50 
However, a situation of war may provide some exceptions. At least in terms of 
honesty, there may be some clear exceptions where lying (i.e. the opposite of 
honesty) is permitted. It is narrated that Asma’ binti Yazīd said that Prophet 
Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said: 
 ُيَِلَ  اْلَكِذبَم ِإلَّ ِفَ َثاَلثَ  ُيمَدِ ثَم الرَّجملَم اْمرَأَتَهَم ِلُيمِْضيَ َها َواْلَكِذبَم ِفَ اْْلَْربَِ َلَ 
 َواْلَكِذبَم لِيمْصِلحََ َبْيََ النَّاسَِ
“It is not lawful to lie except in three cases: Something the man tells 
his wife to please her, to lie during war, and to lie in order to bring 
peace between the people.”51 
It must be noted that the authenticity of prophetic narrations is a big deal 
and subject to a rigorous critical process towards its sanad (chain of narrators) and 
mattan (content) even before thinking of interpreting it. Narrations are classified 
into either saḥīḥ (authentic), ḥasan (good), ḍa‘īf (weak), and various others 
considered worse than ḍa‘īf such as fabricated, no chain of narrators found, etc. The 
process is very rigorous, and for the purpose of legal rulings generally only saḥīḥ 
and ḥasan narrations can be considered.52 
Having that said, there is a discussion regarding the authenticity this 
narration. Al-Tirmidhi in that same ḥadīth commented that such a narration is 
ḥasan gharib (the chain is good, but one narrator is alone in narrating it), and Al-
Albani said it is authentic.53 In the chain of narrators there is Shahar ibn Hawshab, 
and the scholars differ about him but it seems that most of them say he is honest 
but weak and Ibn Hajr seems to agree with this latter view.54 However, at least the 
mattan (content) seems to be correct because it is corroborated by another authentic 
ḥadīth.55  
Further, there is a famous narration authentically reported by various 
companions of Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص:  
 اْْلَْربَم خمْدَعةَ 
“War is deceit.”56 
 
50 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 1 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), 
ḥadīth no. 33. 
51 Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā al-Sulamī Al-Tirmidhī, Jami Al-Tirmidhi, vol. 4 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 
2007), ḥadīth no. 1939. 
52 For the general process, see: Syed Abdul Majid Ghouri, Pengenalan Ilmu Mustalah Al-
Hadith (Selangor Darul Ehsan: Darul Syakir Enterprise, 2017). 
53 Muḥammad Nāṣiruddīn Al-Albānī, Ṣaḥīḥ Wa Ḍa‘īf Sunan Al-Tirmidhi, vol. 2 (Riyadh: 
Maktabah al-Ma’arif, 1419), 356–57. 
54 See: Ibn Ḥajar Al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrib Al-Tahdhib (Syria: Dar al-Rashid, 1406), 269. 
55 Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj Al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, 2nd ed., vol. 6 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 
2007), ḥadīth no. 6633-6634. 
56 Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 4:ḥadīth no.3028-3030; Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-
Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, vol. 5 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), ḥadīth no.4539-4540. 
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A famous narration concerning deception is regarding the assassination of Ka‘b 
ibn Ashraf by Muḥammad ibn Maslama. Ka‘b ibn Ashraf was a Jewish man from 
the tribe of Banū Al-Naḍīr who, after the battle of Badr, slandered Prophet 
Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and went to Makkah to provoke the Quraysh. After obtaining 
explicit permission to use deception from Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, Muḥammad ibn 
Maslama approached Ka‘b ibn Ashraf, requesting help and conversing with him 
to get closer.57 Eventually, Ibn Maslama tricked Ka‘b until he was allowed to be 
very close to then strongly hold him allowing Ibn Maslama’s companions to 
commit the mortal strike.58 
As an important side note, at first glance the aforementioned narration 
does not seem to tell a story of war considering that the assassination took place 
after the battle of Badr was over. The tribe of Banū Al-Naḍīr (where Ka‘b bin 
Ahsraf belonged) were not, as a clan, in war with the Muslims at the time either. 
However, the Muslims who had just fought in the battle of Badr were still in a state 
of war with the Quraysh and this assassination was related to Ka‘b bin Ashraf’s 
assistance and provocations to the Quraysh. This is why the narration is among 
the common basis used by jurists to rule that deception is permissible during 
warfare. Additionally, Imam Al-Bukhari, Imam Muslim, and Imam Abu Dawud 
recorded the narration of the assassination in chapters titled ‘Book of Jihad’, ‘Book 
of Military Expeditions’ and the ‘Book of Jihad and Expeditions’ respectively. 59 
The choice of chapter titles usually indicate how the compilers understood the 
narrations in the chapter, especially in case of Imam Al-Bukhari it is known that 
his chapter titles indicate fiqh al-Bukhari (the legal rulings of Al-Bukhari).60 
In the later generations, numerous Islamic scholars and jurists have written 
about the permissibility of deception in form of lying during warfare. Imam al-
Ṭabari noted that there is a difference of opinion regarding the permissibility of 
lying during warfare. Al-Ṭabari said that some jurists rule that warfare only 
‘misleading’ or ‘white-lying’ is permitted (perhaps the equivalent of ‘white lying’), 
but he said that the correct opinion is to say that ‘full lying’ is permissible during 
warfare.61 In this issue, Al-Nawawī holds the opinion that ‘white-lying’ is 
 
57 Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 5 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), 
ḥadīth no.4037; Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 4:ḥadīth no.3031-3032; al-Naysābūrī, Sahih 
Muslim, 5:ḥadīth no. 4664; Abu Dawud Sulaymān ibn al-Ash‘ath Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, vol. 
3 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2008), ḥadīth no. 2768.  
58 Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 5:ḥadīth no.4037; Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 
4:ḥadīth no.3031-3032; al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, 5:ḥadīth no. 4664; Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 
2008, 3:ḥadīth no. 2768. 
59 Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 5:ḥadīth no.4037; Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 
4:ḥadīth no.3031-3032; al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, 5:ḥadīth no. 4664; Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 
2008, 3:ḥadīth no. 2768. Although Imam Al-Bukhari and Imam Abu Dawud also recorded the same 
narration in a different chapter in their works, i.e. ‘The Book of Mortgaging’ and ‘The Book Of Kharãj, 
Fai', and Imarah’ respectively. See: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 3 
(Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), ḥadīth no. 2510; Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 2008, 3:ḥadīth no.2786. 
60 Ibn Ḥajar Al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ Al-Bārī Fī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-
Ma’rifah, 1379), 13. 
61 Cited in: Yaḥya ibn Sharaf Al-Nawawī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim Sharḥ Al-Nawawī, vol. 3 (Damascus: 
Dar al-Khayr, 1416), 404. 
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preferable to full lying, but both are permissible.62 He argues that lying is 
permissible in times of war or any similar situation which requires such a lie to 
save one’s own life or that of others.63 
Another scholar, Ibn Ḥajar, explains that the idea of deception is to display 
something which is different from the truth. In other words, masking reality with 
illusion.64 He noted that one should always beware of deception and do their best 
to deceive the enemy, because one who is unaware of deception would be at great 
loss.65 Ibn Ḥajar further cites other jurists such as Ibn al-‘Arabi who said that ruses 
can be done by deceiving the enemy or ambushing.66 He also cited Ibn al-Munīr 
who explained that the best way to fight a war is to skillfully deceive the enemy, 
and not merely relying on face-to-face confrontation which may risk more 
casualties on the attacker rather than using deception properly.67 As can be seen in 
this explanation, there is a strong sense of maṣlaḥat in this rule. 
The warrior and jurist Imam ibn Nuhās explained more kinds of deception 
which should be done by the Muslims. He mentioned the importance of espionage 
by sending spies to infiltrate the enemy ranks: to find out as much as possible 
about the enemy’s strength, causing disruption among their ranks, and to feed the 
enemy with false information about the Muslim army.68 He also mentioned the 
importance of identifying hidden traps or other psychological warfare that may 
affect the enemy morale.69 
2. Trustworthiness, Treachery, and War 
With respect to trustworthiness, there are also endless evidence of its 
importance. In fact, the term amānah is derived from the root  ن م ا , from which the 
word īmān (faith) is also derived from.70 Allah says in the Qur’ān, Surah Al-Anfāl 
(8) verse 27: 
 ََيأَي َُّها الَِّذيَن آَمُنوا ََل ََتُونُوا اَّللََّ َوالرَُّسوَل َوََتُونُوا أََماََنِتُكْم َوأَنُتْم تَ ْعَلُمونَ 
 “O you who have believed, do not betray Allah and the Messenger 
or betray your trusts while you know [the consequence].” 
He also decrees in Surah al-Nisā’ (4) verse 58: 
ُتم َبنْيَ النَّاِس َأن ََتُْكُموا ِإنَّ اَّللََّ ََيُْمرُُكْم َأن تُ َؤدُّوا اْْلََماََنِت ِإََل  َأْهِلَها َوِإَذا َحَكمْ 
يًعا َبِصْيًا  ِِبْلَعْدلَِۚ ِإنَّ   ِإنَّ اَّللََّ َكاَن َسَِ
 اَّللََّ نِِعمَّا يَِعُظُكم ِبهِِۗ
 
62 Cited in: Ibn Ḥajar Al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ Al-Bārī Fī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar 
al-Ma’rifah, 1379), 184. 
63 Yaḥya ibn Sharaf Al-Nawawī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim Sharḥ Al-Nawawī, vol. 4 (Damascus: Dar al-
Khayr, 1416), 420. 
64 Al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ Al-Bārī Fī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī, 1379, 2:183. 
65 Al-ʿAsqalānī, 2:183. 
66 Al-ʿAsqalānī, 2:183. 
67 Al-ʿAsqalānī, 2:183. 
68 Abū Zakariyā Muḥī Al-Dīn Ibn Nuhās, Mashāri‘ Al-Ashwāq Ilaā Maṣāri‘ Al-Ushāq (Beirut: 
Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islamiyyah, 1990), 1075–77. 
69 Ibn Nuhās, 1078–79. 
70 Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon: In Eight Parts, 1:102. 
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 “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are 
due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. 
Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever 
Hearing and Seeing.” 
Ibn Kathīr explained in his tafsīr regarding this verse that the obligation to 
fulfil trusts apply both to the rights of Allah (e.g. ṣalāt, zakāt, shawm, etc) as well as 
the rights of fellow humans which includes whatever has been trusted towards 
each other.71 He further cites72 a narration where Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is reported 
to have said: 
 َخاَنكََ َمنَْ ََتمنَْ َولََ ائْ َتَمَنكََ َمنَِ ِإَلَ األََمانَةََ أَد َِ
“Render the trust back to the one who entrusted it to you, and do 
not betray the one who betrayed you.”73 
When it comes to trustworthiness, there seems to be a different rule 
concerning exceptions. While war becomes an exception towards the prohibition 
of lying, there are dalā’il which instead prohibit treachery (i.e. the opposite of 
trustworthiness) specifically during warfare. Allah says in Surah Al-Anfāl (8) verse 
58: 
 ئِِننَي  ٍم ِخَيانًَة فَانِبْذ إِلَْيِهْم َعَلى  َسَواءٍَۚ ِإنَّ اَّللََّ ََل ُيُِبُّ اْْلَاَوِإمَّا ََتَاَفنَّ ِمن قَ وْ 
 “If you [have reason to] fear from a people betrayal, throw [their 
treaty] back to them, [putting you] on equal terms. Indeed, Allah 
does not like traitors.” 
Ibn Kathīr mentioned that this verse is especially related to peace treaties 
among nations when there is a fear that the other party might betray the said 
treaty.74 The final part of the verse (“Indeed, Allah does not like traitors”) refers 
not only generally towards traitors or the other party who wishes to betray but 
includes treachery against the disbelievers even when there is fear of treachery on 
 
71 Ismail ibn Katsir, Shahih Tafsir Ibnu Katsir, ed. Safiurrahman Al-Mubarakfuri, vol. 2 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Katsir, 2016), 559. 
72 ibn Katsir, 2:559. 
73 There is a discussion regarding this narration: it is found  are from two different chains 
i.e. Yusuf bin Mahk and Abu Hurayrah respectively in: Abu Dawud Sulaymān ibn al-Ash‘ath Al-
Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, vol. 4 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2008), ḥadīth no. 3534-3535. Darussalam, the 
publisher of this book, mentioned that those narrations are not authentic: Al-Sijistānī, 4:154. Afterall, 
the Abu Hurayrah chain has a narrator named Sharik ibn ‘Abdullah who is noted as honest by the 
scholars of ḥadīth, but some say he has bad memory while Imam Bukhari and Muslim lists him as a 
supporting (not main) narrator. See: Yūsuf ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥman Al-Mizzī, Tahdhib Al-Kamal, vol. 12 
(Beirut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah, 1400), 462; Al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrib Al-Tahdhib, 266. The other chain (i.e. 
Yusuf bin Mahk) seems to have no issue except Yusuf bin Mahk himself who is a Tābi‘īn and did not 
meet the Prophet himself. However, Al-Albani ruled both narrations to be authentic because of the 
different chains of narrators which may corroborate each other: Muḥammad Nāṣiruddīn Al-Albānī, 
Irwa Al-Ghalil, vol. 5 (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 1405), 381. At the very least, the mattn does not 
seem to contradict the other basis cited in this article and can at least be used to corroborate the other 
basis. 
74 Ismail ibn Katsir, Shahih Tafsir Ibnu Katsir, ed. Safiurrahman Al-Mubarakfuri, vol. 4 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Ibnu Katsir, 2016), 107–9. 
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their part.75 Further, Mu‘āwiyah withdrew from an attack he was launching 
against the Byzantines when their peace treaty had just ended, because ‘Amr ibn 
‘Abasah warned him that such an attack would be treasonous as Prophet 
Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said: 
َها َأوَْ َنهَم َوَبْيََ ق ََْومَ  َعْهدَ  َفالََ َيشمدَ  عمْقَدةَ  َولََ َُيمل َها َحّتََّ يَ ن َْقِضيََ أََمدم  َمنَْ َكانََ بَ ي ْ
 يَ ْنِبذََ إِلَْيِهمَْ َعَلى َسَواءَ 
“Anyone who has a covenant with people, he is not to strengthen it 
nor loosen it, until the covenant has expired, or both parties bring it 
to an end.”76 
The above narration shows that two companions (i.e. Mu‘āwiyah and ‘Amr 
ibn ‘Abasah) of Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص have understood that treaties should be 
ended fairly even for the enemy and even in the event when the that enemy is 
indicated to intend to betray the treaty.77 In addition, narrated by Buraydah, 
Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said: 
 اْغزموا ِِبْسمَِ اّللََِّ ِفَ َسِبيلَِ اّللََِّ قَاتِلموا َمنَْ َكَفرََ ِِبّللََِّ اْغزموا وََ لََ تَ غَمل وا َولََ تَ ْغِدرموا َولََ
َا  َُتْث ملموا َولََ تَ ْقت ملموا َولِيد 
“Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against 
those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a holy war, do not embezzle 
the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) 
bodies; do not kill the children.”.78 
Allah further also decrees in Surah al-Nisā’ (4) verse 58: 
ِإنَّ اَّللََّ ََيُْمرُُكْم َأن تُ َؤدُّوا اْْلََماََنِت ِإََل  َأْهِلَها َوِإَذا َحَكْمُتم َبنْيَ النَّاِس َأن ََتُْكُموا 
 ِإنَّ اَّللََّ نِ 
يًعا َبِصْيًا  ِِبْلَعْدلَِۚ  ِإنَّ اَّللََّ َكاَن َسَِ
 ِعمَّا يَِعُظُكم ِبهِِۗ
 “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are 
due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. 
Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever 
Hearing and Seeing.” 
Ibn Kathīr explained in his tafsīr regarding this verse that the obligation to 
fulfil trusts apply both to the rights of Allah (e.g. ṣalāt, zakāt, shawm, etc) as well as 
the rights of fellow humans which includes whatever has been trusted towards 
each other.79 He further cites80 a narration where Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is reported 
to have said: 
 َخاَنكََ َمنَْ ََتمنَْ َولََ ائْ َتَمَنكََ َمنَِ ِإَلَ األََمانَةََ أَد َِ
 
75 ibn Katsir, 4:107–9. 
76 Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 2008, 3:ḥadīth no. 2759; Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā al-Sulamī Al-
Tirmidhī, Jami Al-Tirmidhi, vol. 3 (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), ḥadīth no 1580. 
77 This is also the understanding of Ibn Kathīr. See: ibn Katsir, Shahih Tafsir Ibnu Katsir, 2016, 
4:107–9. 
78 al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, 5:ḥadīth no. 4522. 
79 ibn Katsir, Shahih Tafsir Ibnu Katsir, 2016, 2:559. 
80 ibn Katsir, 2:559. 
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“Render the trust back to the one who entrusted it to you, and do 
not betray the one who betrayed you.”81 
Therefore, when discussing the permissibility of deception during warfare, 
the jurists speak of how it is permissible to lie but not to commit treason. By 
‘treason’ (khiyānat), in terms of language, it means “to be entrusted but did not 
fulfil it faithfully/sincerely, and to betray covenants/agreements.”82 In addition, Al-
Raghib said “Khiyānat and nifāq are one same thing. However, khiyānat applies to 
covenants, while amānah and nifāq applies to matters of the religion (dīn)… 
Khiyānat is to go against the truth and secretly breach covenants.”83 The strong 
relation between treason and treaties is further cemented in a ḥadīth reported by 
Anas ibn Mālik who narrated that Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said:  
 لَهَم َعْهدََ َلَ ِلَمنَْ ينََدَِ َوَلَ لَهم، أََمانَةََ َلَ ِلَمنَْ ِإميَانََ َلَ
“There is no faith in those who do not have amānah, and there is no 
religion in those who do not fulfill their covenants/agreements”.84 
The jurists seem to follow the aforementioned understanding and notes 
how ‘treachery’ refers to the breaking of treaties or promises. Al-‘Ayni cites a 
narration where ‘Umar ibn Al-Khaṭṭāb declared that hinting safe passage towards 
an enemy soldier only to trick and then kill that enemy soldier is an act of treachery 
and punishable by death.85 This situation may seem to be analogous to any other 
scenario where the enemy is invited to or promised safety from attack (e.g. truces 
and negotiation), where making such invitation or promise only to betray it would 
likewise be considered as treachery.  
 
81 These narrations are from two different chains i.e. Yusuf bin Mahk and Abu Hurayrah 
respectively in: Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 2008, 4:ḥadīth no. 3534-3535. Darussalam, the 
publisher of this book, mentioned that those narrations are not authentic: Al-Sijistānī, 4:154. Afterall, 
the Abu Hurayrah chain has a narrator named Sharik ibn ‘Abdullah who is noted as honest by the 
scholars of ḥadīth, but some say he has bad memory while Imam Bukhari and Muslim lists him as a 
supporting (not main) narrator. See: Al-Mizzī, Tahdhib Al-Kamal, 12:462; Al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrib Al-
Tahdhib, 266. The other chain (i.e. Yusuf bin Mahk) seems to have no issue except Yusuf bin Mahk 
himself who is a Tābi‘īn and did not meet the Prophet himself. However, Al-Albani ruled both 
narrations to be authentic because of the different chains of narrators which may corroborate each 
other: Al-Albānī, Irwa Al-Ghalil, 5:381. At the very least, the mattn does not seem to contradict the 
other basis cited in this Sub-Chapter and can at least be used to corroborate the other basis. 
82 Abu al-Husayn Ahmad bin Faris, Mu’jam Maqayis Al-Lughah, vol. 1 (Misr: Muṣṭāfā al-Bāb 
al-Ḥalab wa Awladuh, 1972), 313. 
83 Cited in: ʿAbd al-Ra’ūf ibn Tāj al-ʿArifīn Al-Munāwī, Tawqīf ʿalā Muhammāt Al-Taʿārīf (al-
Qāhirah: ’Alam al-Kutub, 1410), 160. 
84 Narrated in the Musnad of Imam Aḥmad: Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad Imām Aḥmad, ed. 
Shu’ayb Al-Arnawth (Taḥqīq), vol. 19 (Beirut: Mu‘assasah al-Risalah, 1421), ḥadīth no.12383; Aḥmad 
ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad Imām Aḥmad, ed. Shu’ayb Al-Arnawth (Taḥqīq), vol. 20 (Beirut: Mu‘assasah al-
Risalah, 1421), ḥadīth no.12567 and 13199. All of these narrations have Muḥammad ibn Sulaym in 
the chain, who is honest but weak according to many scholars: Ibn Ḥajar Al-ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhib Al-
Tahdhib, vol. 9 (India: Dā’irah Al-Ma‘ārif Al-Niẓamiyah, 1326), 195. However, Muḥammad ibn 
Sulaym is supported by other chains so their status are elevated to ḥasan according to al-Arnawth (in 
the aforementioned citation of the Musnad in this footnote) and authentic according to Al-Albani: 
Muḥammad Nāṣiruddīn Al-Albānī, Ṣaḥīḥ Jami’ Al-Ṣaghir, vol. 2 (Beirut: Maktab al-Islami, 1988), 1205. 
85 Badruddin Al-‘Aynī, ’Umdah Al-Qārī, vol. 15 (al-Qāhirah: Idarat Al-Taba’at Al-Muniriya, 
n.d.), 94. As cited in Munir, “Suicide Attacks and Islamic Law,” 83. 
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Imam Al-Nawawi mentioned that there is a consensus that deception is 
impermissible if it results in violating agreements or amān (safety guarantee).86 Al-
Shaybānī explains that even Muslims who have treacherously obtained permission 
to enter the enemy territory (e.g. pretending to be an ambassador or emissary, 
forging documents, etc) must still honor that entry permission.87 Meaning, that 
they must not commit harm in the territory of the enemy because the entry 
permission is like a safety guarantee agreement. This position is also endorsed by 
Al-Sarkhasī who ruled that even in situations where the Muslims may end a treaty 
with the enemy, fair warning must be given towards that enemy that such treaty 
is to be ended or else it is considered as an act of treachery which is unacceptable.88 
Modern jurists seem to echo the same ruling. ‘Abdullah ‘Azzām, for 
example, rules that using peace agreements as part of an act of ruse to deceive the 
enemy is an unlawful act of treachery.89 He adds also that, in a modern context, 
visas are similar to amān thus Muslims committing any acts of violence in the state 
which gave her/him that visa is considered as treason.90 
Muhammad Hamidullah noted that it is impermissible to commit acts of 
‘treachery and perfidy’ (he did not define these two terms),91 and also that treaties 
which prohibit certain acts during war must be obeyed as long as the treaty lasts.92 
Al-Qardhawy also explains that it is permissible to lie during warfare and commit 
other deception towards the enemy but it is prohibited to do so in a manner that 
breaches agreements or amān.93 
 
Suicide attackers feigning as civilians: a verdict 
After considering the aforementioned explanation, the conclusion 
regarding suicide attackers feigning as civilians can be found. However, more 
considerations will need to be made. 
1. Suicide Bombers Feigning as Civilians: Is It Treachery? 
There seems to be nothing to suggest that a combatant disguising as a 
civilian would, in itself, constitute as breaking a treaty or promise. Even though 
 
86 Al-Nawawī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim Sharḥ Al-Nawawī, 1416, 3:404. 
87 Cited in: Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abi Sahl Al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ Al-Siyār Al-Kabīr, vol. 2 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub ’Ilmiya, 1997), 66–67. 
88 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abi Sahl Al-Sarakhsī, Sharḥ Al-Siyār Al-Kabīr, vol. 1 (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub ’Ilmiya, 1997), 185. 
89 ‘Abdullah ‘Azzām, Fī Ẓilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Peshawar: Markaz al-Shahīd ‘Azzām Al-
I‘lamī, n.d.), 17. 
90 ‘Azzām, 14–18, 50. This is why some scholars suggest that, although ‘Azzām was the 
founder of Al-Qaeda, he would not have approved of the infamous 9/11 attack to the World Trade 
Center had he have been still alive at the time. Although, ‘Azzām’s theological and operational 
positions are different from Osama bin Laden (and, consequently, different from the Al-Qaeda we 
know today). See: Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mohamed Redzuan Salleh, “Abdullah Azzam: 
Would He Have Endorsed 9/11?,” RSIS Commentaries, 2009, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/1188-abdullah-azzam-would-he-have/#.WRFL_dKGPIU. 
91 Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, 205. 
92 Hamidullah, 208. 
93 Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, Fiqih Jihad (Bandung: Mizan, 2010), 632–36. 
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Muhammad Hamidullah cited that there was a tradition of combatants wearing 
identifying insignia, but it does not seem to suggest an obligation.94 
One may attempt to tweak the words around and suggest that presenting 
one-self as a civilian brings trust in the enemy combatants, therefore attacking in 
such state is a ‘break of trust’ thus ‘treacherous’. However, this seems to be 
pushing things too far. Further, such an interpretation will contradict the lesson 
obtained from the narration regarding Muḥammad ibn Maslama explained earlier.  
Muḥammad ibn Maslama was known as a warrior. He was an ahl al-Badri 
(i.e. fought in the Battle of Badr), and the assassination of Ka‘b ibn Ashraf occurred 
not long after the battle of Badr and before the Battle of Uhud.95 However, when 
ibn Maslama approached Ka‘b ibn Ashraf, he did not present himself as a 
combatant but simply as an average Muslim who was (pretending to be) fed up 
with Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص and seeking for some help. Therefore, at the time it 
can be said that Muḥammad ibn Maslama was pretending to be a normal civilian 
when approaching his target. However, the entire mission was on the orders of 
Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and Muḥammad ibn Maslama specifically requested 
permission to lie which was then granted.96 
Having that said, from an Islamic perspective, it is difficult to classify 
suicide bombers feigning as civilians as an act that is, in itself, treacherous. The 
prohibition against treachery cannot be used to rule out such a method. Therefore, 
Muhammad Munir’s claim, at least to this extent, is disagreeable.  
However, the above conclusion is a very general one, while specific 
circumstances may offer different conclusions. Some deceptions involving 
treachery can be potentially used as advantage for suicide missions. It is not 
unthinkable for a soldier to receive trust by first entering into an agreement with 
an intention to later break it and attack. It has been done before. 
Approaching the end of the 19th century, Teuku Umar, a Muslim lord under 
the Aceh Sultanate during the war against the Dutch invaders. He famously 
pretended to cooperate with the Dutch to fight his fellow Aceh people only to later 
ambush the Dutch soldiers, killing them and seizing their weapons and supplies. 
Albeit the advantage that Teuku Umar’s tactic gave in the war, it is essential to 
evaluate the case from an Islamic standpoint.97  
 
94 Rather, it was simply due to maṣlaḥat as to distinguish one’s forces from that of the 
opponent. See: Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, 235. 
95 Ismail Ibn Kathir, The Life of the Prophet by Ibn Kathir, vol. 2 (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 
2005), 340; Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ihsaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 330. 
96 Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 5:ḥadīth no.4037; Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, 1997, 
4:ḥadīth no.3031-3032; al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, 5:ḥadīth no. 4664; Al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abu Dawud, 
2008, 3:ḥadīth no. 2768. 
97 Arya Ajisaka, Mengenal Pahlawan Nasional (Jakarta Selatan: PT Kawan Pustaka, 2018), 46. 
It is important to note that this is without any disrespect to Teuku Umar, which is a national hero of 
the Republic of Indonesia as per Presidential Decree No. 087/TK/1973. This does not mean to 
undermine his efforts, struggle, and martyrdom for the independence of Aceh and Indonesia in any 
way. Islam teaches that only Prophet Muḥammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص is free from error. Everyone else can make 
mistakes, however a person who does ijtihad there are two rewards when they are correct and one 
reward when they are incorrect. See: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl Al-Bukhārī, Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 9 
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What Teuku Umar agreed and promised to do for the Dutch invaders was 
not only treason towards the Islamic state (i.e. the Sultanate of Aceh) but a promise 
to fight against and very likely kill fellow Muslims of the Aceh fighters. Therefore, 
the agreement that Teuku Umar with the Dutch was invalid and therefore not 
binding according to Islamic law as the object of agreement is a violation of the 
Sharī‘ah. Consequently, legally under Islamic law, there was no agreement for 
Teuku Umar to betray. However, nonetheless the Dutch had placed their trust and 
amānah and, regardless of the other factors, Teuku Umar double-crossing them is 
still a breach of amānah. 
Much more recently in 2010, a Jordanian doctor named Humam Khalil 
Abu-Mulal al-Balawi was working with the Jordanian intelligence and the CIA to 
feed them information on Al-Qaeda.98 He has been doing so for a while, until one 
day he was thought to be ready to deliver some important information. Instead, 
after being escorted to meet important CIA officials to provide such information, 
he triggered a bomb which destroyed himself and the seven CIA officials with 
him.99 If one considers the USA and Al-Qaeda to be in war with each other, perhaps 
the CIA can be considered as combatants. However, that Al-Balawi was initially 
working with the Jordanians and the CIA (whether as a triple agent from the start 
or ‘converting’ after). This implies that there was an agreement, which Al-Balawi 
then betrayed.  
By participating as an informant like this, Al-Balawi is technically no longer 
a civilian. However, this illustrates an example where treachery towards 
agreements or promises has been committed in order to reach a good position from 
which to commit a suicide attack. It is not impossible that other combatants can 
pretend to be logistics suppliers or the likes (i.e. agreeing to provide services and 
thus given access to the enemy), feigning as civilians, to then get close to the enemy 
and commit suicide attacks. In this case, then such an act may be classified as 
treachery. 
Therefore, as far as the Islamic notion of treason is concerned, feigning as 
civilians is not in itself treacherous except when it is committed in combination 
with breaking treaties or promises. However, this is not the end of the discussion 
regarding this matter. There are other matters that would need to be discussed that 
may affect the conclusion as explained in the following Sub-Sections. 
2. Maslahat Considerations 
It has been explained earlier that maṣlaḥat is a very important consideration 
in deriving rulings concerning the Islamic laws of war. Certain decisions may be 
permissible in its original rule, but specific circumstances may cause muḍarat (loss) 
and therefore should not be done.  
 
(Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), ḥadīth no.7352. Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj Al-Naysābūrī, Sahih Muslim, vol. 4 
(Riyadh: Darussalam, 2007), ḥadīth no.4487-4489. These aḥadīth mention judge rulings, but they are 
understood to apply also to ijtihad in general. See: Al-Utsaimin, Ushul Fiqih, 129–30. 
98 Toby Harnden, “Could the CIA Have Achieved What Al-Qaeda Did?,” Telegraph UK, 
January 9, 2010, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6956806/Could-
the-CIA-have-achieved-what-al-Qaeda-did.html. 
99 Harnden. 
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Especially in the era of modern urban warfare, where the risk of civilian 
losses has increased exponentially and practically inevitable.100 One can only 
imagine the psychology of a soldier during urban warfare, and how difficult it will 
be when a person in civilian outfit approaches or makes sudden movements, while 
the opponent is known to feign as civilians. Commenting on the war in 
Afghanistan, The Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions reported that, if the Taliban keeps on feigning as civilians while 
committing suicide bombing, it would be more difficult for the opposing force to 
determine whether an incoming civilian is really a civilian or a suicide bomber.101 
Also commenting on Afghanistan, the Human Rights Watch noted that, due to 
numerous suicide bombers feigning as civilians, the rate of soldiers erroneously 
shooting actual civilians actually potentially increases.102  
Therefore, even if the original rule of feigning civilian status may be 
permissible, such a tactic may only be used when the maṣlaḥat outweighs the 
muḍarat. Considering the potential civilian losses due to the habit of feigning as 
civilians as explained in the previous paragraph, it may be difficult to find any 
situation where the maṣlaḥat is higher than the potential calamities.  
It seems that, given the reality of modern warfare, exceptions may be made 
only in very special circumstances where extreme maṣlaḥat is to be attained and 
massive muḍarat is to be avoided. Even in such circumstances it must be only 
conducted after very careful deliberations by the commanders and only conducted 
very rarely instead of on a regular basis. An example to this was when the 
Columbian forces disguised as a humanitarian mission to save hostages from 
notoriously hostile rebel groups.103 This case is not exactly about feigning civilians, 
but the logic used is applicable by analogy because it may illustrate an example 
where the otherwise unlawful deception averted a much greater potential muḍarat. 
Another potential exception would perhaps be naval warfare, as it does not 
share the difficulties of urban warfare such as the density of civilian population. 
Also, civilian ships can be easily detected from miles away unlike in urban warfare 
 
100 Nathalie Durhin, “Protecting Civilians in Urban Areas: A Military Perspective on the 
Application of International Humanitarian Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 98, no. 901 
(2016): 178–89; Valerie Epps, “Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral 
Damage Rule,” Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 41 (2012): 307–55. 
101 HRC, “A/HRC/11/2/Add.4, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Mission To Afghanistan, 6 May 2009,” 2009, 14. 
102 HRW, “The Human Cost: The Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan,” 
Human Rights Watch 19, no. 6(c) (2007): 93–94, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/afghanistan0407/afghanistan0407webwcover.pdf. 
103 However, this is a controversial case. International law scholars have differed on the 
matter. See: Jonathan Crowe and Kylie Weston-Scheuber, Principles of International Humanitarian Law 
(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 66–67; Richard Jackson, “Perfidy in Non-
International Armed Conflicts,” in Non-International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, ed. 
Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2012), 247; Gary 
D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 422; John C. Dehn, “Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Columbian Hostage 
Rescue, the Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s Reaction,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 6 (2018): 627–53. 
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where people can suddenly show up just around the corner (hence giving time for 
proper inspection). In this situation, the risk of future civilian casualties would be 
much less and therefore more chances for feigning civilians to be conducted in a 
manner that does not cause higher muḍarat than maṣlaḥat.  
3. Modern IHL Considerations 
It could be seen that, in principle, Islamic law approaches the question of 
deception and its limitations in a different way from modern IHL. Modern IHL 
seems to treat the issue of perfidy from the lense of protecting non-combatants. On 
the other hand, Islamic law not only shares the same interest as explained in the 
previous sub-section. Rather, it also prohibits betrayal of agreements or pledges 
which modern IHL does not seem to touch. Therefore, arguably at least in theory, 
the Islamic laws of war covers more than modern IHL in this regard. 
Nonetheless, there may be some room for the Muslims to adopt these 
provisions of modern IHL to further solidify the Islamic law interest to protect 
non-combatants. Most Muslims are organized into nation states, and a vast 
majority of them have ratified most modern IHL instruments. Therefore, those 
nations including Muslim nations who have consented to be bound by AP I must 
therefore obey its contents to the extent that it does not contradict the Qur’ān or 
Sunnah. 
Particularly referring to Article 37(1)(c) of AP I, committing attacks while 
feigning as civilians would be a breach of the treaty and therefore an act of 
treachery. After all, feigning as civilians in Islamic law is not really a particular 
command from Allah for the Muslims to do but simply one possible strategy to 
undertake if there is maṣlaḥat in it. Such a provision to prohibit this type of strategy 
does not seem to violate the Qur’ān or Sunnah, in the sense that it does not 
contradict a prohibition or deny an obligation. Therefore it may seems that this 
provision could be seen as valid. In addition to that, if such rule is a well-practiced 
customary international law, it may also be Islamically binding by virtue of 
reciprocity according to fiqh al-siyar as explained earlier. 
However, there is some problem when discussing non-State Islamic 
fighting groups, as they are not parties to treaties –not even the Additional 
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions 1949 (1977) (hereinafter, AP II) which 
regulates non-international armed conflicts. Even from the perspective of 
international law, there are some question raised towards the legal ratio behind 
the binding nature of the AP II towards non-state actors.104 
This may lead to some problems as to whether, as a question of legal 
theory, non-state armed groups can be bound by such treaties.105 In addition, it is 
debatable whether the rules related to perfidy in non-international armed conflicts 
 
104 Marcos D. Kotlik, “Towards Equality of Belligerents: Why Are Armed Groups Bound by 
IHL?,” in Experts Conference on International Humanitarian Law: Emerging Issues in the Law of Armed 
Conflict (American University Washington College of Law and the American Society of International 
Law’s Lieber Society, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621783. 
105 Kotlik, 6–14. 
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(as per AP II) have customary international law status.106 However, if in fact this 
rule is practiced in non-international armed conflicts or at least by the opponent of 
the Muslims, then non-state Islamic fighting groups must also abide by the 
prohibition to disguise as civilians when committing suicide attacks by virtue of 
reciprocity. 
4. The Question of Reprisals 
It is important to note that in case when there are strong indications that 
the enemy combatants are about to commit treachery as understood in fiqh al-jihād, 
one must practice caution in deciding how to act. Sub-Section “Trustworthiness, 
Treachery, and War” cited some dalīl prohibiting to betray even those who 
betrayed the Muslims. While the authenticity of some of the dalīl may be disputed, 
still the content is corroborated by the other general Qur’ān verses and aḥadīth 
regarding the impermissibility of committing treason. One especially relevant was 
Surah Al-Anfāl (8) verse 58 which indicates that betrayal may not be responded by 
betrayal, although this verse speaks of treaties in particular but the line of 
reasoning is similar and therefore relevant.  
What might seem to be the more proper and safer response towards a 
strong likelihood of enemy combatants feigning amān or treaties is firstly to not 
pretend to believe in the feign. Pretending to believe in the enemy maneuver may 
indicate acceptance towards an offer (of amān, truces, or surrenders) and therefore 
placing a trust which is intended to be betrayed. The following step would depend 
on what the commander sees fit, for example to not allow the enemy to approach 
for their fake truce to begin with or to accept them but with extra caution in order 
to anticipate (but not attacking or breaking trust first). 
On the contrary, modern IHL seems to allow treacherous perfidy to be 
committed as an act of reprisal. Reprisals are allowed if following these 
requirements: (a) conducted towards an enemy who has already committed a 
violation, with purpose to stop them from doing so, (b) as a last resort, (c) 
proportional, (d) decided by the highest level of government, and (e) stops when 
the enemy has ceased the violation.107 In addition, civilians may not be the object 
of reprisals as per Article 51(6) of AP I.108 Perfidy, by definition targets only enemy 
combatants, making it lawful to make perfidy when the enemy commits it first.109 
However, Islamic laws of war does not and cannot share the rules on 
reprisals with modern IHL insofar as the act of perfidy is also a treasonous act as 
understood by Islamic law, and retaliating in form of similar act of treachery. 
Otherwise, it may be possible for the Muslims to retaliate in other forms of lawful 
manners such as terminating existing agreements or conducting non-treacherous 
military operations. This even if the Muslim nation is party to AP I and other 
relevant treaties. However, if the enemy force commits an act of perfidy which 
 
106 Except as a minor breach, instead of a grave breach as per AP I. See: Solis, The Law of 
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War, 422. 
107 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2005, 1:515–19. 
108 See also: Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 1:520. 
109 See also Dehn, “Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Columbian Hostage Rescue, the 
Capture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s Reaction,” 649–51. 
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does not constitute as treachery as understood by Islamic law (e.g. feigning as 
civilians), then a likewise reprisal may be warranted.  
This means that, to some extent, Islamic law is more strict than modern IHL 
arguably providing more protection towards those who may otherwise be target 
of retaliation by treachery. 
 
Conclusion 
In the end, it is found that the act of disguising as civilians by suicide 
bombers is generally Islamically impermissible. Those who seem to be famously 
known to commit suicide attacks usually belong to non-state armed groups such 
as Al-Qaeda affiliated militias, although some state militias (such as the Taliban 
who previously ruled over Afghanistan, and the Al-Qassam brigades which is 
loosely related to Palestine). However, this is an Islamic obligation towards all 
Islamic fighters, regardless whether they belong to an Islamic state bound by 
modern IHL rules and/or customary laws. 
Such obligation arises despite the act not necessarily seen as treacherous as 
per Islamic law standards. At least, it is not so in itself. The reason is that Islamic 
law sees that treachery, as an impermissible method deception, is an act of 
betraying treaties or promises. The act of disguising as civilians, at face value, does 
not seem to fall under that category. 
However, this is merely a general conclusion absent context. Certain 
circumstances may affect the general ruling. For example, committing a suicide 
attack by feigning as a civilian while also breaking a treaty or promise would 
constitute as an act of treason. In addition, even if such an act does not constitute 
as treason under Islamic law, it might still be impermissible on the basis of either 
fiqh al-siyar (i.e. making reference to some parts of modern IHL) or maṣlaḥat. This 
change of ruling due to circumstances must be made on a case-per-case basis 
considering the situation at the time.  
As a side but important note, it may be interesting to observe that, while 
answering the main problem, some ‘side discoveries’ can be found. As is explained 
in the previous section concerning coverage of protection and reprisals, there are 
areas where Islamic law may provide better protection than modern IHL. Possible 
higher standards provided by Islamic law can be found also in various other 
issues, such as the protection of the environment during war110 and treatment of 
war captives.111  
 
110 An environmental damage must be widespread, long-term and severe for it to be a 
violation towards IHL. On the other hand, mere disproportionate damage to the environment is 
already a violation of Islamic law. See: Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, “Fiqh Al-Jihad Dan 
Perlindungan Lingkungan Di Perang Modern,” in Diskursus Soal Islam, Politik, Dan Hubungan 
Internasional, ed. Muhammad Qobidl ’ Ainul Arif (Yogyakarta: Deepublish Publisher, 2020). 
111 Modern IHL requires good treatment towards war captives. Islamic law requires the 
same as a minimum requirement, but also religiously encourages the Muslims to provide for the 
captives better than what they provide for themselves as a mandub act. It must be noted that Islamic 
legal injunctions are not limited to ‘obligations’ (wajib) and ‘prohibition’ (haram), but also 
‘encouraged’ (mandub, incurs divine reward if done), ‘discouraged’ (makruh, incurs divine reward if 
avoided), and mubah (permissible, neither good nor bad). See: Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, 
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Perhaps an open, fair, deep, and positive dialogue between international 
law and Islamic law might be very fruitful and constructive. 
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